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Transmutations and the Presumption of Undue 
Influence: A Quagmire in Divorce Court 
Sara Craig* 
In the past thirty years, California’s community property system has 
undergone a transformation driven by statutory changes, including the 
enactment of a statute of frauds for transactions between partners1 and the 
imposition of heightened fiduciary duties between partners,2 as well as 
judicial interpretation of these statutory changes.3  As a result of these 
changes, divorcing partners now have greater opportunity to influence the 
outcome of the court’s division of the community property by appearing as 
sympathetic as possible on the witness stand.  In this note, I will discuss 
briefly the history of California’s community property laws, and more 
particularly, the presumption of undue influence as applied to 
transmutations.4  Section I provides background and context for the 
discussion, including principles of community property as they are applied 
in California statutes and jurisprudence.  Section II describes the 
application of the presumption of undue influence to transmutations in the 
context of recent cases; explains how judicial interpretation of what 
constitutes an unfair advantage to one partner over the other has led to 
tension between the fiduciary obligations imposed by section 721(b) and 
the writing requirement codified at section 852(a) of the Family Code; and 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.S., 
Neurobiology, Physiology and Behavior, University of California, Davis, 2002.  First, I 
wish to thank Professor Jo Carrillo for her unstinting and insightful guidance throughout the 
writing process and for her kind encouragement along the way.  I also thank Adjunct 
Professor James B. Creighton for his generous advice on estate planning.  I want to thank 
Adjunct Professor Kevin Romano for stimulating my interest in Community Property with 
his superlative teaching and for providing feedback from the perspective of a skillful 
divorce attorney.  Finally, I am grateful to my family for teaching me that all people deserve 
justice and equality. 
 1. CAL. FAM. CODE § 852(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.).  California also 
created an entirely new relationship that gives rise to community property, the registered 
domestic partnership.  CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297, 297.5 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.).  
Throughout this article, I will use the term “partners” as an inclusive reference to both 
spouses and registered domestic partners. 
 2. CAL. FAM. CODE § 721(b) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.).   
 3. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Haines, 33 Cal. App. 4th 277, 301 (1995). 
 4. “Transmutation” is the term applied to a transfer between spouses or registered 
domestic partners that transforms property from separate property of one of the partners to 
community property, or community property to separate property.  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1638 (9th ed. 2009). 
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shows how lack of precedents from the appellate courts and instructions 
from the Legislature creates a danger that some lower courts will apply 
outmoded social stereotypes and undervalue work performed in the home.  
Finally, Section III proposes that California’s Legislature and judiciary 
should change the way that parties in dissolution proceedings are allowed 
to raise and rebut the presumption of undue influence, first by redefining 
“any unfair advantage” from section 721(b)5 as an advantage to one partner 
that disadvantages or damages the community estate, which will bring the 
statute in line with the purpose of a community property system, and 
second by clarifying whether the writing requirement under section 852(a)6 
operates as a statute of frauds with traditional contracts law exceptions.  
Section III also gives some recommendations for attorneys and partners 
contemplating transmutation, which will be helpful in the absence of 
legislative or judicial action. 
I.  PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 
The concept of community property, as it is currently practiced in 
California, arose among Visigothic tribes where women had to work the 
land alongside their husbands,7 or other “migratory and nomadic peoples 
which led a hard and dangerous existence, [where] the wife shared with her 
husband its dangers and vicissitudes, [and] she was fully cognizant of the 
details of and shared in his daily life and labor.”8  One such people, the 
Mongols, had a law that “women should attend to the care of the property, 
buying and selling at their pleasure.  Men should occupy themselves only 
with hunting and war.”9  By contrast, the common law system practiced 
elsewhere in the United States developed among the nobility in Normandy 
and England, where a wife had no property rights separate from those of 
her husband, and she was merely “a beautiful possession to adorn and grace 
the manor.”10  Ultimately, scholars theorize that the common law system 
survived in England because “the upper classes in turning their faces 
against the community system effectively strangled its development in 
England.”11  In settings where community property systems proliferated, on 
the other hand, spouses generally had little property before marriage so 
they each had an equal stake in the resulting community estate because 
each of their efforts created it.12  Therefore, community property systems 
 
 5. CAL. FAM. CODE § 721(b) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 6. CAL. FAM. CODE § 852(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 7. Michael J. Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Inter-Spousal 
Transactions, 19 BAYLOR L. REV. 20, 32–33 (1967). 
 8. WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
§ 11, 20 (2d ed. 1971). 
 9. Id. at 19 (quotation omitted). 
 10. DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 8, at 22. 
 11. DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 8, at 21. 
 12. DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 8, at 21. 
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protect investment in the family and recognize the value each partner 
contributes by giving each a present interest in the community estate.13   
A. RELATIONSHIPS THAT GIVE RISE TO COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
In California, two types of relationships give rise to community 
property: marriage and registered domestic partnership.14  A valid marriage 
requires a license and a ceremony,15 whereas a valid registered domestic 
partnership requires paperwork be completed and filed with the California 
Secretary of State.16  California law holds that a marriage is void at the 
solemnization stage only if the marriage is incestuous17 or bigamous.18  The 
Legislature made similar provisions for valid registered domestic 
partnerships, codified at section 297(b) of the Family Code.19   
Additionally, the California Family Code protects a putative spouse: 
any party who has a good faith belief that he or she has entered a valid 
marriage or registered domestic partnership, but who has not done so 
because of an unmet procedural requirement.20  Because of the putative 
spouse doctrine, the court will determine that all property that would have 
been community property, had all the procedural requirements for a valid 
marriage or domestic partnership been met, is quasi-marital property,21 
thereby allowing for equitable division of the estate upon dissolution.22 
Finally, California extends community property to a marriage 
contracted in another state that “would be valid by the laws of the 
 
 13. Vaughn, supra note 7, at 40–41. 
 14. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 760 & 297.5 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 15. CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 16. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.); see also Velez v. Smith, 
142 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 1167 (2006) (citing Armijo v. Miles, 127 Cal. App. 4th 1405, 1414 
(2005)); but cf. In re Domestic Partnership of Ellis, 162 Cal. App. 4th 1000, 1008 (2008) 
(extending putative spouse doctrine to domestic partners). 
 17. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2200 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 18. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2201 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.).  A voidable marriage, 
on the other hand, involves fraud, force, lack of ability to consent, lack of sound mind of 
either partner, or physical incapacity of either partner, which occurs at the solemnization 
phase.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 2210 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.).  Voidable marriages 
can be rendered valid if the partners “freely cohabit[ ] with the other as husband or wife.”  
CAL. FAM. CODE § 2210 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 19. The requirements for a valid registered domestic partnership include that “[n]either 
person is married to someone else or is a member of another domestic partnership with 
someone else that has not been terminated, dissolved, or adjudged a nullity” and “[t]he two 
persons are not related by blood in a way that would prevent them from being married to 
each other in this state.”  CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.).   
 20. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2251 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.); see also In re 
Domestic Partnership of Ellis, 162 Cal. App. 4th 1000, 1008 (2008) (applying the putative 
spouse doctrine to domestic partnerships). 
 21. In re Marriage of Tejeda, 179 Cal. App. 4th 973, 977 (2009); Ellis, 162 Cal. App. 4th 
at 1008.  But see In re Marriage of Guo & Sun, 186 Cal. App. 4th 1491, 1499 (2010) 
(holding that partner who does not have objectively reasonable good faith belief in validity 
of marriage cannot rely on putative spouse doctrine). 
 22. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2251 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
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jurisdiction in which the marriage was contracted.”23  Originally, this 
statute enabled California courts to recognize common law marriages 
contracted in states that allow them.24  In 2009, Senate Bill 54 amended the 
statute to extend recognition to same sex marriages contracted in states that 
allow them.25 
B. CHARACTERIZATION OF PROPERTY AS SEPARATE OR COMMUNITY 
Upon dissolution, the court must characterize the property as either 
community or separate property.26  The court employs several 
presumptions to aid in the characterization process.  First, outside the 
context of a dissolution proceeding for property with record titles, the court 
applies the general title presumption: It presumes that the property is 
characterized in accord with the title.27  However, for dissolution purposes 
only, the court treats any property held in joint tenancy or tenancy in 
common by partners as community property, unless the partners have 
clearly indicated separate interests.28  Second, any property obtained by the 
partners between the date of marriage or registration and the date of 
dissolution is presumed to be community property, irrespective of time, and 
belong to the community estate.29  This presumption is known as the 
community property presumption.30  Both partners own a present undivided 
one-half interest in the community estate.31  This present interest separates 
community property jurisdictions from common law jurisdictions, even 
though most common law jurisdictions in the United States now practice 
some form of equitable division upon dissolution.32  All property acquired 
through the partners’ time, energy, and skill during the marriage or 
partnership is characterized as community property,33 unless the partners 
have an agreement to the contrary.34  Courts treat quasi-marital property 
arising from putative marriage or partnership the same as community 
property upon dissolution.35   
 
 23. CAL. FAM. CODE § 308 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.).   
 24. People v. Badgett, 10 Cal. 4th 330, 363 (1995). 
 25. 2009 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 625 (West). 
 26. “Characterization” is the process by which the court determines whether property is 
separate or community to facilitate equitable distribution.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 265 
(9th ed. 2009). 
 27. CAL. EVID. CODE § 662 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.).  Section 662 also states 
that clear and convincing evidence is required to rebut the general title presumption.  Id. 
 28. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2581 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 29. CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.); see also CAL. FAM. 
CODE § 297.5(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 30. GAIL BOREMAN BIRD & JO CARRILLO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CALIFORNIA 
COMMUNITY PROPERTY 98 (10th ed. 2011). 
 31. CAL. FAM. CODE § 751 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.).   
 32. BIRD & CARRILLO, supra note 30, at 11. 
 33. Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 7 (1909). 
 34. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 35. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2251(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
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Partners can rebut the community property presumption by proving 
that specific property was acquired before marriage, by inheritance, or by 
gift.36  This property is then characterized as separate property.37  Separate 
property also includes any proceeds, rents, or income earned from 
ownership and management of underlying separate property.38  Because 
partners frequently commingle39 their assets during their relationship, upon 
dissolution they frequently have to prove the character of separate property 
by tracing its acquisition to a separate property source.40  Also, real or 
personal property owned or acquired by either or both of the partners in 
another jurisdiction, that would have been community property, had it been 
acquired in California, is known as quasi-community property and is 
treated as community property upon dissolution.41 
Finally, partners can transmute property by agreement or transfer.42  
Before 1985, spouses in California could prove transmutation of property 
by resorting to oral testimony or conduct of the parties.43  In its findings 
recommending changes to the transmutation rules, the California Law 
Revision Commission stated, “The rule of easy transmutation has . . . 
generated extensive litigation in dissolution proceedings.  It encourages a 
spouse, after the marriage has ended, to transform a passing comment into 
an ‘agreement’ or even to commit perjury by manufacturing an oral or 
implied transmutation.”44  On this recommendation, California enacted 
Civil Code section 5110.730, the predecessor to Family Code section 852, 
which held that “[a] transmutation of real or personal property is not valid 
unless made in writing by an express declaration that is made, joined in, 
consented to, or accepted by the spouse whose interest in the property is 
adversely affected.”45  For a time after section 852(a) went into effect, 
courts strictly interpreted the statute and did not allow partners to introduce 
parol evidence to prove or disprove transmutations.46  However, subsequent 
 
 36. CAL. FAM. CODE § 770(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.).  See also CAL. 
CONST. art. 1, § 21. 
 37. CAL. FAM. CODE § 770(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.).  See also CAL. 
CONST. art. 1, § 21. 
 38. CAL. FAM. CODE § 770(a)(3). 
 39. BIRD & CARRILLO, supra note 30, at 338. 
 40. Hicks v. Hicks, 211 Cal. App. 2d 144, 157 (1962). 
 41. CAL. FAM. CODE § 125 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.).  Upon death of one of 
the partners, only personal property in other jurisdictions is included as part of the 
community estate.  CAL. PROB. CODE § 66 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.).   
 42. CAL. FAM. CODE § 850 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 43. See, e.g., In re Raphael’s Estate, 91 Cal. App. 2d 931, 938–39 (1949). 
 44. RECOMMENDATION RELATING TO MARITAL PROPERTY PRESUMPTIONS AND 
TRANSMUTATIONS, 17 CAL. L. REVISION COMM’N REPORTS 205, 214 (1984). 
 45. CAL. FAM. CODE § 852(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.) (corresponds to CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 5110.730(a)). 
 46. See Estate of MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d 262, 267–68 (1990). 
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changes to the Family Code eroded the court’s strong stance in reliance on 
written records.47   
C. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF PARTNERS 
The community property system conceives of marriage (and registered 
domestic partnership, by extension) as a partnership of equals.48  As it is 
practiced today in California, among other benefits, partners enjoy 
equitable division of the community estate upon death or dissolution.49  
Originally, even in community property jurisdictions, husbands had the 
responsibility to manage property, including property belonging to their 
wives.50  Beginning in 1975, California switched to a system of equal 
management and control, under which “either [partner] has the 
management and control of the community personal property . . . with like 
absolute power of disposition . . . as the spouse has of the separate estate of 
the spouse.”51  Equal management and control extends to community real 
property, with one caveat: “[B]oth [partners] . . . must join in executing any 
instrument by which that community real property or any interest therein is 
leased for a longer period than one year, or is sold, conveyed, or 
encumbered.”52 
However, with these rights come responsibilities.  In order to facilitate 
equal management and control, the partners now have fiduciary obligations 
to one another, codified at Family Code section 721.53  Section 721(a) 
recognizes the freedom of contract that comes with equal management and 
control,54 but section 721(b) curtails that freedom by holding that, “in 
transactions between themselves, [partners are] subject to the general rules 
governing fiduciary relationships which control the actions of persons 
occupying confidential relations with each other.”55  Although the standard 
now includes “a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing,”56 it has not 
always held that partners are forbidden from taking “any unfair advantage” 
of each other.57  In fact, the standard has evolved and changed as courts 
 
 47. See Section II.C, infra. 
 48. Vaughn, supra note 7, at 40–41. 
 49. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 50. WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR. & CYNTHIA A. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 205 (2d ed. 1982). 
 51. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.).  Subsection (d) 
provides a business exception: “[A] spouse who is operating or managing a business or an 
interest in a business that is all or substantially all community personal property has the 
primary management and control of the business or interest.”  Id. § 1100(d). 
 52. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1102(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 53. CAL. FAM. CODE § 721 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 54. Id. § 721(a). 
 55. Id. § 721(b). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 5103(b) (Deering Supp. 1991) (amended 1992) (repealed 
1994). 
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decided cases and the Legislature responded, and the changing nature of 
the obligation has often caused confusion.   
II.  FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS AND TRANSMUTATIONS: AN 
UNEASY TRUCE 
A. THE ERA OF LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION: 1975-1994 
In the era of male management, the fiduciary relationship functioned to 
assure the wife that, where she ceded management and control of her 
separate property as well as her portion of the community estate to her 
husband, he would be required to exercise a high standard of care in 
managing that property.58  However, when California adopted equal 
management and control effective January 1, 1975, amendments to sections 
5125 and 5127 of the Civil Code “changed the fiduciary duty to one of 
good faith.”59  In 1984, California enacted Civil Code section 5110.730(a), 
the predecessor to Family Code section 852(a), requiring any transfer 
between marital partners to be in writing signed by the adversely affected 
partner.60  This change, which was recommended by the California Law 
Revision Commission, was made because the Commission recognized that 
the convenience of allowing oral transmutations had led to “extensive 
litigation in divorce proceedings.”61  In 1986, just over one year after the 
writing requirement under section 5110.730(a) took effect, the Legislature 
again addressed the duty of care required between partners, describing the 
duty as a “good faith in confidential relations” standard,62 rather than a 
fiduciary standard.  This description of the duty between partners occurred 
in the context of enacting a bill that sought to provide additional remedies 
for breaches of the duty of care between partners.63  Presciently, opponents 
to this bill raised concerns that the good faith standard, coupled with the 
remedies provided by the accompanying statutes, would “raise[ ] the 
possibility of ‘pillow talk’ discussions and other oral ‘agreements’ being 
dragged into a courtroom, after recent legislative changes to have it 
excluded.”64  Regardless of these concerns raised by opponents, the bill 
was enacted, amending Civil Code section 5125(e) to incorporate the “good 
 
 58. In re Cover’s Estate, 188 Cal. 133, 143 (1922). 
 59. In re Marriage of Stevenot, 154 Cal. App. 3d 1051, 1068 (1984). 
 60. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110.730(a) (Deering Supp. 1985) (repealed 1994); CAL. FAM. 
CODE § 852(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 61. RECOMMENDATION RELATING TO MARITAL PROPERTY PRESUMPTIONS, supra note 44, 
at 214. 
 62. 1986 Cal. Stat. Ch. 1091, sec. 3(c), microformed on Calif. Legislative Bills 1989–90, 
Senate Bill 1070–74 (Library Microfilms). 
 63. Letter from Senator Bill Lockyer to Governor George Deukmejian (Aug. 28, 1986), 
microformed on Governor’s Chaptered Bill File, Reel 201 1986 (Cal. St. Archives). 
 64. Sen. 1071, 1985–86 Reg. Sess., Assembly Third Reading, 4 (Cal. 1986), microformed 
on Calif. Legislature 1985–86, State Assembly File Analysis, Senate Bill 1033–87 (Library 
Microfilms). 
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faith in confidential relations” standard.65  Therefore, less than two years 
after Civil Code section 5110.730(a) went into effect, the Legislature 
enacted statutes that cracked open the door once again to admit parol 
evidence. 
Three years later, Assembly Bill 2194, which would have raised the 
standard of care back to the fiduciary standard, passed in both houses of the 
California Legislature, but the governor vetoed the bill, commenting: 
The finality of a judgment is a very important aspect of family law 
for both spouses. . . .  Currently, it is fairly easy to set aside a 
judgment incorporating a marital settlement agreement of the 
parties during the first six months after issuance of that judgment, 
but much more difficult thereafter.  This bill could severely impact 
the doctrine of finality by allowing either spouse, even many years 
later, to appeal to a court to set aside a judgment and marital 
settlement agreement, based upon a claimed breach of fiduciary 
duty.66 
AB 2194, if enacted, would have amended Civil Code section 5103 to 
require that, “in transactions between themselves, a husband and wife are 
subject to the general rules governing fiduciary relationships which control 
the actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each other.”67  
Notably, this version of the bill did not include the prohibition on a partner 
obtaining “any unfair advantage” over the other partner.68   
In 1991, Senate Bill 716, which had very similar language to AB 2194, 
was enacted.  SB 716 changed Civil Code section 5103 to state that marital 
partners have “the same rights and duties of nonmarital business partners”69 
and, notably, added that “neither shall take any unfair advantage of the 
other.”70  The Legislative Counsel’s Digest stated that the bill would: 
(1) revise requirements with respect to the disclosure and notice that 
must be provided by one spouse to the other spouse, 
(2) revise provisions related to when a spouse may bring a claim 
against the other spouse for breach of this fiduciary duty, 
 
 65. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125(e) (Deering Supp. 1987) (amended 1991) (repealed 1994).  
See also 1986 Cal. Stat. Ch. 1091, microformed on Calif. Legislative Bills 1989–90, Senate 
Bill 1070–74 (Library Microfilms). 
 66. Assem. 2194, 1989–90 Reg. Sess., Governor’s Veto, 3 (Cal. 1989), microformed on 
Calif. Legislature 1989–90, State Assembly File Analysis, Assembly Bill 2156–94 (Library 
Microfilms). 
 67. Assem. 2194, 1989–90 Reg. Sess., sec. 2 (Cal. 1989), microformed on Calif. 
Legislative Bills 1989–90, Assembly Bill 2193–96 (Library Microfilms). 
 68. Id. 
 69. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5103(b) (Deering Supp. 1992) (repealed 1994).  See also 1991 Cal. 
Stat. Ch. 1026, sec. 2, microformed on Calif. Legislative Bills 1991–92, Senate Bill 713–16 
(Library Microfilms). 
 70. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5103(b) (Deering Supp. 1992) (repealed 1994).   
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(3) recast and clarify the circumstances in which a spouse may 
make a gift or dispose of community personal property without 
the consent of the other spouse, and 
(4) provide additional remedies for breach of this fiduciary duty by 
a spouse to the other spouse.71 
Comments from the Senate Third Reading indicate that proponents 
emphasized that the amendment to the standard of care was needed “to 
resolve the ambiguity regarding the appropriate standard of care during the 
marriage and continuing until the dissolution which has been caused by the 
Alexander and Baltins cases.”72  In In re Marriage of Alexander, the First 
District Court of Appeal held that a spouse who signed a settlement 
agreement and quitclaim deed without representation of counsel had no 
right to set aside the marital settlement agreement fifteen months after the 
court rendered its dissolution judgment where the court subsequently found 
no evidence of extrinsic fraud.73  The Court’s decision was based on the 
adversely affected spouse’s failure to timely challenge the marital 
settlement agreement,74 and as a corollary, the Court held that an 
amendment to the statutory duty of good faith enacted by the Legislature in 
1986 “[did] not change the good faith duty each spouse has to disclose the 
existence of community assets to the other until the property is divided.”75 
In re Marriage of Baltins likewise dealt with events that occurred after 
the partners had separated but before their property was divided.76  In 
Baltins, the court found that the advantaged partner exerted such a degree 
of “psychological, emotional, and financial control” over the adversely 
affected partner, which continued after the partners had separated and 
extended to execution of the marital settlement agreement, that his actions 
“constitute[d] constructive fraud.”77  Both cases cited by the Legislature as 
a reason for enacting the higher standard thus focused on division of the 
assets pursuant to dissolution, a time when partners typically are not acting 
in the best interests of the community.  Because of this narrow focus on a 
time when partners are more likely to self-deal and less likely to want to 
benefit the community estate, the Legislature set a very high standard to 
deter self-dealing.  But, as the opponents pointed out, the amendment to the 
standard had the effect of “impos[ing] the new duty retroactively over 
 
 71. 1991 Cal. Stat. Ch. 1026, sec. 2, microformed on Calif. Legislative Bills 1991–92, 
Senate Bill 713–16 (Library Microfilms). 
 72. Sen. 716, 1991–92 Reg. Sess., Senate Third Reading 3 (Cal. 1991) (emphasis added), 
microformed on Calif. Legislature 1991–92, State Assembly File Analysis, Senate Bill 672–
742 (Library Microfilms). 
 73. In re Marriage of Alexander, 212 Cal. App. 3d 677, 680–82 (1989). 
 74. Id. at 684. 
 75. Id. at 683–84 (emphasis added). 
 76. In re Marriage of Baltins, 212 Cal. App. 3d 66, 89 (1989). 
 77. Id. 
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every transaction in every existing marriage, without any opportunity for 
spouses to protect themselves against past acts which were proper when 
carried out.”78   
When the California Law Revision Commission made its 
recommendations for a consolidated Family Code, it recommended using 
nearly identical language as that contained in Civil Code section 5103(b), 
and this language was adopted as Family Code section 721(b).79  These 
obligations place the partners in a relationship equivalent to that of 
“nonmarital business partners, as provided in Sections 16403, 16404, and 
16503 of the Corporations Code. . . .”80  Additionally, neither partner is 
allowed to take “any unfair advantage of the other.”81  Among the duties 
owed by one partner to another are those of loyalty,82 care,83 access to 
books and records,84 and disclosure.85  The language of the statute gives 
color to the court’s consideration of transactions between partners by 
explaining that the “confidential relationship imposes a duty of the highest 
good faith and fair dealing on each [partner]. . . .”86  Because the 
Legislature has imposed this high standard and forbade partners from 
taking “any unfair advantage,”87 courts have been required to determine 
what exactly constitutes “any unfair advantage.”  This inquiry has led to 
tension between the fiduciary obligations imposed by section 721(b) and 
the writing requirement imposed by section 852(a), causing uncertainty for 
partners attempting to effect transmutations. 
In In re Marriage of Haines, the California court applied the 
presumption of undue influence, frequently raised in contracts law, to 
invalidate a transmutation that complied with the (recently enacted) writing 
requirement of section 852(a).88  The case involved a husband who got his 
wife to sign a quitclaim deed to their community property by promising to 
cosign a car loan and then withholding his signature unless the wife 
 
 78. Sen. 716, 1991–92 Reg. Sess., Senate Third Reading 3 (Cal. 1991), microformed on 
Calif. Legislature 1991–92, State Assembly File Analysis, Senate Bill 672–742 (Library 
Microfilms). 
 79. FAMILY CODE, 22 CAL. L. REVISION COMM’N REPORTS 1, 129–30 (1992); CAL. FAM. 
CODE § 721(b) (amended 2002) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.).  The 2002 amendment 
did not change the fiduciary standard; instead, it merely applied it to property held in trust 
and corrected a few technical errors.  2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 310 (S.B. 1936) (West).  
Thus, the current version of section 721(b) retains nearly the same language that was 
enacted in 1994.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 721(b) (amended 2002) (West, Westlaw through 2012 
Sess.). 
 80. CAL. FAM. CODE § 721(b) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 81. Id. 
 82. CAL. CORP. CODE § 16403(b) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 83. CAL. CORP. CODE § 16404(c) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 84. CAL. CORP. CODE § 16403 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 85. Id.; CAL. FAM. CODE § 721(b) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 86. CAL. FAM. CODE § 721(b) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 87. Id. 
 88. In re Marriage of Haines, 33 Cal. App. 4th 277, 302 (1995). 
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actually signed the quitclaim deed.89  The Haines court also established 
factors sufficient to rebut the presumption of undue influence: the 
advantaged partner must show that the transmutation “was freely and 
voluntarily made, and with a full knowledge of all the facts, and with a 
complete understanding of the effect of the transfer.”90  While judges in 
subsequent cases have considered Haines as more a case of duress than 
undue influence,91  Mrs. Haines’s attorney’s successful use of the 
presumption of undue influence to defeat the statute of frauds started a 
flood of additional litigation aimed at invalidating transmutations by 
resorting to parol evidence.92  In 2006, Professor Christine Manolakas 
predicted that the conflict between Section 852(a) and Section 721(b) 
created by Haines and subsequent cases would give “disgruntled spouses in 
dissolution proceedings . . . the power to set aside the title to property or a 
valid transmutation of property simply by testifying as to insufficient 
consideration or undue influence with the ultimate result of increased 
litigation and potential perjury.”93  Indeed, since 2006, the situation has 
become direr than even Professor Manolakas predicted.   
B. THE ERA OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: 1994 TO PRESENT 
Since 1994 when Family Code section 721(b) went into effect, 
California appellate courts have decided over seventy cases in which one of 
the parties attempted either to allege or to invalidate a transmutation in 
circumstances that implicated the presumption of undue influence.94  Only 
twelve of these cases have been published,95 and one of these is no longer 
citable because review has been granted by the California Supreme Court.96  
This paucity of published cases provides little guidance for lower courts 
rendering decisions, attorneys counseling their clients, and partners 
planning their estates and conducting their affairs.  With so few published 
 
 89. In re Marriage of Haines, 33 Cal. App. 4th 277, 284 (1995). 
 90. Id. at 296 (citation omitted). 
 91. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Delaney, 111 Cal. App. 4th 991, 999 (2003). 
 92. In re Marriage of Haines is cited in 206 subsequent cases.  33 Cal. App. 4th 277 
(1995) (Westlaw, Cal. Case Law). 
 93. Christine Manolakas, The Presumption of Undue Influence Resurrected: He Said/She 
Said Is Back, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 33, 81 (2006). 
 94. Search for “presum! /s undu! /2 influence & transmut!” after Jan. 1, 1994, 
Westlawnext.com (last visited Mar. 8, 2013). 
 95. In chronological order, they are: In re Marriage of Haines, 33 Cal. App. 4th 277 
(1995); In re Marriage of Barneson, 69 Cal. App. 4th 583 (1999); In re Marriage of 
Campbell, 74 Cal. App. 4th 1058 (1999); In re Marriage of Delaney, 111 Cal. App. 4th 991 
(2003); In re Marriage of Benson, 36 Cal. 4th 1096 (2005); In re Marriage of Weaver, 127 
Cal. App. 4th 858 (2005); In re Marriage of Mathews, 133 Cal. App. 4th 624 (2005); In re 
Marriage of Burkle, 139 Cal. App. 4th 712 (2006); In re Marriage of Balcof, 141 Cal. App. 
4th 1509 (2006); In re Marriage of Lund, 174 Cal. App. 4th 40 (2009); Starr v. Starr, 189 
Cal. App. 4th 277 (2010); and In re Marriage of Valli, 195 Cal. App. 4th 776 (2011). 
 96. In re Marriage of Valli, 124 Cal. Rptr. 3d 726 (2011), review granted, 258 P.3d 750 
(2011). 
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decisions, trial and appellate courts have rendered inconsistent decisions, 
particularly where the courts consider whether to adhere to the 
unambiguous language in a transmutation agreement,97 whether to consider 
other contract law principles,98 and how to weigh credibility of the partners 
as witnesses.99  In part, these inconsistencies can be attributed to the fact-
intensive inquiries required to equitably divide assets upon dissolution.100  
The slightest change in the facts or witness testimony presented can change 
the outcome completely,101 thereby perpetuating ad infinitum the exact 
scenario that the Legislature intended to prevent by enacting section 
852(a).102 
In the cases that have reached the appellate court level since Haines, a 
few trends emerge.  Partners frequently transmute property in connection 
with obtaining financing.103  If one partner quitclaims so that they can 
obtain a better interest rate or pay less fees on a home loan, most courts 
find a valid transmutation,104 as in In re Marriage of Mathews, where the 
court found that Mr. Mathews rebutted the presumption of undue influence 
by demonstrating that Mrs. Mathews was conversant with financial matters 
and spoke fluent English.105  Courts also follow Haines by looking for 
evidence of fraud, deception, coercion, or duress, and where such evidence 
appears, courts uniformly invalidate the resulting transmutation.106  If the 
 
 97. See Section II.B.1, infra. 
 98. See Section II.B.2, infra. 
 99. See Section II.B.3, infra. 
 100. See, e.g. In re Marriage of Walrath, 17 Cal. 4th 907 (1998). 
 101. See, e.g. In re Marriage of Mathews, 133 Cal. App. 4th 624, 632 (2005) (finding 
transmutation valid where wife assumed she would be added to title later); but cf. Starr v. 
Starr, 189 Cal. App. 4th 277, 286–87 (2010) (finding transmutation invalid where wife 
testified that husband told her he would add her to title later). 
 102. CAL. FAM. CODE § 852(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.).   
 103. See, e.g. In re Marriage of Mathews, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 627. 
 104. See In re Marriage of Buijnorouski, No. D038649, 2002 WL 31684973 at *2–3 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2002); In re Marriage of Stringer, No. A100272, 2003 WL 21457047 at *4 
(Cal. Ct. App. June 24, 2003); In re Marriage of Melcher, No. H022141, 2006 WL 119127 
at *15 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2006); In re Marriage of Nguyen, No. G036127, 2006 WL 
2425346 at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2006); In re Estate of Padilla, No. B195940, 2008 
WL 4194494 at *7–8 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept., 15, 2008); In re Fondario, No. E045156, 2010 
WL 1501478 at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2010); In re Marriage of Santana, No. E050070, 
2011 WL 3566974 *3–4 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2011); In re Marriage of Nelipovich, No. 
D058435, 2012 WL 130392 at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2012); In re Marriage of Redden, 
No. C060046, 2012 WL 5458558 at *5–6 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2012); Osinoff v. Huter, 
No. B233539, 2013 WL 123706 at *2–3 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2013).  But see In re 
Marriage of Sullinger, No. G028868, 2002 WL 31794153 at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 
2002) (holding that quitclaim for financing was insufficient to effect transmutation). 
 105. In re Marriage of Mathews, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 632. 
 106. See In re Marriage of Balcof, 141 Cal. App. 4th 1509, 1522–24 (2006); In re 
Soliman, No. E030034, 2002 WL 31188703 at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2002); In re 
Marriage of Prokuski, No. F047224, 2006 WL 1606981 at *4, *22 (Cal. Ct. App. June 13, 
2006); In re Marriage of Vrcic, No. B183910, 2007 WL 2390804 at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 
23, 2007); In re Marriage of Isensee, No. G039317, 2008 WL 2222963 at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. 
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court finds the writing inadequate to effect a transmutation under section 
852(a), it usually will rely on this finding to hold that no transmutation 
occurred.107  Courts found valid transmutations in many of the cases where 
the adversely affected partner had advice of counsel, although this factor 
usually was not conclusive.108  Additionally, nearly every court attempts to 
assess the sophistication of the adversely affected partner, and if he or she 
is found to be a sophisticated party the court frequently finds the 
presumption of undue influence is rebutted.109   
Still, because section 721(b) requires the court to examine every 
transaction between partners for “any unfair advantage”110 before the court 
can characterize the property conclusively as separate or community, 
section 721(b) effectively trumps all other statutory provisions, including 
the writing requirement under section 852(a),111 the general title 
presumption,112 and the community property presumption.113  The factors 
required to rebut the presumption of undue influence are so difficult to 
 
May 29, 2008); In re Marriage of Fragoso, No. A120650, 2009 WL 466078 at *7 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Feb. 25, 2009). 
 107. See In re Marriage of Benson, 36 Cal. 4th 1096, 1112 (2005); In re Marriage of 
Barneson, 69 Cal. App. 4th 583, 590–92 (1999); In re Marriage of Campbell, 74 Cal. App. 
4th 1058, 1065 (1999); In re Marriage of McCready, No. D050079, 2007 WL 4510154 at *8 
(Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2007); In re Estate of Padilla, No. B195940, 2008 WL 4194494 *8 
(Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2008); In re Marriage of Laushine, No. B197005, 2008 WL 239522 
*3 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2008); In re Marriage of Dinh, No. G043080, 2011 WL 4397008 
at *8–9 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2011); In re Marriage of Wilson, No. B232329, 2012 WL 
1898903 at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. May 25, 2012).  But see In re Estate of Delp, No. G027015, 
2002 WL 80639 at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2002) (holding that lack of valid writing 
complying with Section 852(a) cannot be used by former wife against widow of decedent 
who died intestate). 
 108. See In re Marriage of Burkle, 139 Cal. App. 4th 712, 739 (2006); In re Marriage of 
Eskenazi, No. B156379, 2003 WL 22501563 at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov 5, 2003); In re 
Marriage of Hancock, No. G037502, 2007 WL 1508717 at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. May 24, 2007); 
In re Marriage of Ling and Zee, No. H029885, 2007 WL 1831101 at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. June 
27, 2007); In re Marriage of Menkes, No. G041429, 2010 WL 1620714 at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Apr. 22, 2010); In re Marriage of Pitto and Behrendt, No. A126802 and No. A127429, 2012 
WL 2529300 at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. June 29, 2012).  But see In re Marriage of Kahn, No. 
A128001, 2012 WL 1079579 at *2, *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2012) (upholding trial court’s 
invalidation of transmutation agreement although partners were represented by counsel); In 
re Marriage of Lico, No. A130765, 2012 WL 1560450 at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. May 4, 2012) 
(finding that, although partners were represented by counsel, there was no evidence that 
counsel actually informed adversely affected partner of consequences of transmutation 
agreement). 
 109. See In re Marriage of Burkle, 139 Cal. App. 4th at 734–36; In re Marriage of Valli, 
124 Cal. Rptr. 4th 726, 734 (2011), review granted, 258 P.3d 750 (2011); In re Marriage of 
Eskenazi, No. B156379, 2003 WL 22501563 at *3; In re Marriage of Pavin, No. D041205, 
2004 WL 170442 at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2004); In re Marriage of Vom Dorp, No. 
B170495, 2004 WL 2651268 at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2004); In re Marriage of 
Redden, No. C060046, 2012 WL 5458558 at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2012). 
 110. CAL. FAM. CODE § 721(b) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 111. CAL. FAM. CODE § 852(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 112. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2581 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 113. CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
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assess, since the advantaged spouse effectively must prove the adversely 
affected partner’s state of mind at the time of the transaction,114 and so easy 
to manipulate by the adversely affected partner, that they provide little 
predictability or security to either partner.  Finally, courts do not assess 
uniformly whether the partners obtained mutual advantages, making it 
difficult to determine whether the presumption of undue influence should 
even apply to particular transmutations. 
i. Unambiguous Language Cannot Uniformly Protect Partners 
Section 721(b) casts a long shadow over deeds in the public record, 
making even presumptively valid recorded transfers suspect.  In cases that 
do not invoke community property, but where title is disputed, the court 
normally applies the presumption that the record owner is the beneficial 
holder of title.115  This presumption reflects “public ‘policy . . . in favor of 
the stability of titles to property.’”116  However, when the court also 
considers the presumption of undue influence raised under section 721(b) 
in the context of dissolutions, the Haines court concluded that “public 
policy of the state . . . demands that where there is a conflict between the 
common law presumption in favor of title as codified in section 662 and the 
presumption that a husband and wife must deal fairly with each other, 
application of section 662 is improper.”117  Therefore, in the context of 
dissolution proceedings, the partner defending the transmutation cannot 
point to the clear language in the deed to prove the transmutation if the 
adversely affected partner claims that the transmutation resulted from 
undue influence. 
Even where transmutation is accomplished by agreement, rather than 
by deed alone, partners are not uniformly protected by the use of clear and 
unambiguous language.  In one of the few transmutation cases selected for 
publication, In re Marriage of Lund, the mere insertion above a signature 
block of a clause indicating the signor read and understood the 
Transmutation Agreement was sufficient to overcome the presumption of 
undue influence.118  Yet the Fourth District distinguished Lund on the 
barest of factual differences.  In In re Marriage of Lico, the court found 
that the partners’ Community Property Agreement was “a straightforward, 
comprehensible document.”119  The court also acknowledged that both 
partners were advised by an attorney who prepared, read, and reviewed the 
 
 114. In re Marriage of Haines, 33 Cal. App. 4th 277, 296 (1995). 
 115. CAL. EVID. CODE § 662 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 116. In re Marriage of Haines, 33 Cal. App. 4th at 294 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 605 
(West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.)). 
 117. Id. at 287. 
 118. In re Marriage of Lund, 174 Cal. App. 4th 40, 56 (2009). 
 119. In re Marriage of Lico, No. A130765, 2012 WL 1560450 at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. May 4, 
2012). 
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documents with the partners.120  Yet it declined to follow Lund because the 
court found that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that 
Mrs. Lico failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence because Mr. 
Lico testified that he “did not entirely appreciate the effect of the 
Community Property Agreement,”121 and the attorney who advised the 
Licos represented them jointly and was not a family law specialist.122 
In some cases, clearly, the court must find that the presumption of 
undue influence has not been rebutted because the advantaged partner has 
not adequately proved understanding on the part of the adversely affected 
partner.  For example, the adversely affected partner in In re Marriage of 
Delaney had “cognitive impairments and as a consequence had entrusted 
all marital financial and legal matters to Wife, trusting and relying on her 
judgment and management in this regard.”123  However, allowing the 
adversely affected partner to merely testify that he or she did not 
understand a clearly written agreement, particularly when he or she had the 
assistance of counsel, without requiring a reason why he or she did not 
understand, effectively circumvents the Haines test and gives the adversely 
affected partner the right to “set aside the title to property or a valid 
transmutation of property by simply testifying. . . .”124 
ii. Courts Do Not Uniformly Entertain Arguments Based on Other 
Areas of Contracts Law 
In some transmutation cases, courts are amenable to hearing arguments 
applying general contracts principles to transmutations, whereas in others 
the courts hold that contracts principles beyond the presumption of undue 
influence do not apply.  In In re Marriage of Burkle, the court held that a 
transmutation agreement executed as part of a negotiation while the 
partners were reconciling was valid because the parties had bargained for 
the exchange125 and thereby obtained mutual advantages,126 including for 
one partner “financial security and assurance she would be able to enjoy 
her present lifestyle without hindrance or risk of loss,”127 and for the other 
“financial freedom to make investments that could yield high returns but 
which carried the risk of significant loss.”128  In another published decision, 
Starr v. Starr, the court found that because Mrs. Starr only executed a 
 
 120. In re Marriage of Lico, No. A130765, 2012 WL 1560450 at *3. 
 121. Id. at *9. 
 122. Id. at *8. 
 123. In re Marriage of Delaney, 111 Cal. App. 4th 991, 1000 (2003). 
 124. Manolakas, supra note 93, at 81. 
 125. In re Marriage of Burkle, 139 Cal. App. 4th 712, 727 (2006). 
 126. Id. at 735. 
 127. Id. at 721. 
 128. Id. 
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quitclaim deed due to her reliance on an express promise by Mr. Starr to 
add her back to title, the transmutation was therefore invalid.129   
However, other courts have refused to entertain arguments based on 
contract law principles.  The California Supreme Court, in In re Marriage 
of Benson, held that part performance does not apply to transmutations.130  
In Benson, the partners allegedly had an agreement that Mr. Benson would 
quitclaim his community interest in real property in exchange for Mrs. 
Benson ceding her community interest in Mr. Benson’s retirement 
account.131  Mr. Benson performed his portion of the alleged bargain, 
signing a quitclaim to a trust of which his wife was the beneficiary.132  
However, Mrs. Benson’s promise to cede her claim to Mr. Benson’s 
retirement account was not memorialized by a written agreement.133  
Justice Baxter writing for the Court dismissed Mr. Benson’s argument that 
sections 721(b) and 852(a) were in conflict because Mr. Benson “[did] not 
seek to undo a transmutation that was so grossly one-sided and unfair as to 
be the product of undue influence under section 721(b). . . .  He instead 
invoke[d] these principles to establish a transmutation that fail[ed] to 
comply with the terms of section 852(a). . . .”134  Was the difference 
between Benson and Starr merely that the latter promise in Benson related 
to transmutation of a different asset, rather than a second transmutation of 
the same asset, as was promised in Starr?  Justice Moreno’s concurrence in 
Benson illuminates the subtle difference between the two cases:  
As the majority correctly points out, husband has settled his claim 
with respect to the conveyance of the house he contends was quid 
pro quo for the alleged oral promise to transmute his retirement 
accounts from community property to separate property.  
Therefore, he cannot validly claim before this court that he was 
unlawfully or inequitably disadvantaged by that conveyance.  His 
is the narrower argument that his part performance of an agreement 
with his wife is an adequate substitute for the express declaration 
of transmutation required by section 852, subdivision (a), which 
the majority properly rejects.  We therefore have no occasion to 
decide what statutory or equitable remedy would be available to 
make whole a spouse who has been disadvantaged by an illusory 
oral promise to transmute property, or what sanction may be 
 
 129. Starr v. Starr, 189 Cal. App. 4th 277, 287 (2010).  Mrs. Starr’s attorney phrased the 
argument in terms of constructive fraud, but this argument was disapproved by the court in 
In re Marriage of Feakins, No. A132338, 2013 WL 222444 *3–4 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 
2013). 
 130. In re Marriage of Benson, 36 Cal. 4th 1096, 1109 (2005). 
 131. Id. at 1101–02.  The case became one of dueling witnesses, where Mr. Benson gave 
one version of the story and Mrs. Benson gave another.  Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 1102. 
 134. Id. at 1112. 
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employed against a spouse who has used section 852, subdivision 
(a) as a means of breaching his or her fiduciary duty and gaining 
unjust enrichment.135 
Effectively, the settlement that Mr. Benson reached with the trust, of 
which Mrs. Benson was beneficiary, was fatal to Mr. Benson’s part 
performance argument in the dissolution action.  Yet the Family Code 
explicitly and strongly encourages early settlements by basing “award of 
attorney’s fees and costs on the extent to which the conduct of each party 
or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote 
settlement. . . .”136  The fine distinctions between cases, coupled with the 
pressure to settle early and the threat of having to pay a partner’s attorney’s 
fees and costs, combine to create the danger that adversely affected 
partners like Mr. Benson may be penalized for asserting a valid claim.  This 
danger may be heightened by Justice Baxter’s strong reading of legislative 
intent in section 852(a), that the Court sees “no evidence the Legislature 
intended to incorporate traditional exceptions to the statute of frauds [such 
as partial performance, admission, or promissory estoppel] into section 
852.”137  
iii. Witness Credibility Determinations by the Court Make 
Dissolution Proceedings a Popularity Contest 
In some cases, because trial court judges are forced to make credibility 
determinations about witnesses, dissolution proceedings turn into 
popularity contests.  A recent case from Alameda County demonstrates 
how the court can be swayed by a sympathetic witness and how quickly 
that sympathy can be lost.  In In re Marriage of Kahn, the trial was divided 
into three stages, with the first phase to decide characterization of marital 
assets after two separate transmutations in 2003 and 2005, while the second 
phase would examine whether Mrs. Kahn unduly influenced Mr. Kahn in 
the transmutations, and the third phase would determine spousal support.138  
The first two phases of the trial went well for Mrs. Kahn, who proved to be 
a very sympathetic witness.139  Mr. Kahn did not fare well at all, as the trial 
court found his testimony completely lacking in credibility, especially 
given that other witnesses, including Mr. Kahn’s former attorney, provided 
testimony that directly contradicted what Mr. Kahn said.140  Particularly, 
the trial court found it unlikely that undue influence played any part in the 
2003 and 2005 transmutations, stating that Mr. Kahn “was ‘indeed a master 
 
 135. In re Marriage of Benson, 36 Cal. 4th at 1112–13. 
 136. CAL. FAM. CODE § 271(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 137. In re Marriage of Benson, 36 Cal. 4th at 1109. 
 138. In re Marriage of Kahn, No. A128001, 2012 WL 1079579 at *1-2 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 
2, 2012). 
 139. Id. at *2–3. 
 140. Id. at *2. 
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of control,’ and that ‘[g]iven his intelligence, sophistication and experience, 
it is inconceivable that he would sign the . . . agreement without knowing 
exactly what it said.’”141  However, during the support phase of the trial, 
Mrs. Kahn testified that she had thrown out some tapes belonging to her 
husband when he moved out of their marital home.142  Upon hearing this 
testimony, the trial court reversed its determination that Mrs. Kahn had 
rebutted the presumption of undue influence with regard to the 2005 
transmutation, instead characterizing the properties as Mr. Kahn’s separate 
property.143  The Appellate Court quoted the trial court judge in its 
decision, stating that the court was disappointed to find both Mr. and Mrs. 
Kahn not to be credible witnesses.144  With her admission of one ill-advised 
action,145 Mrs. Kahn, who quit her job as a social worker in 1963 to look 
after the couple’s children and manage Mr. Kahn’s separate property (the 
same property covered by the 2003 and 2005 transmutation agreements),146 
lost all credibility and thereby lost her community property right to the two 
properties at issue.147 
While credibility determinations in other cases have not been as 
dramatic as in Kahn, the trial court’s credibility determination frequently 
plays a deciding role in its decision about whether the presumption of 
undue influence applies and whether it has been rebutted by the advantaged 
partner.  In another recent case, In re Marriage of Santana, Mrs. Santana 
signed a quitclaim deed to her husband so that they could obtain a better 
interest rate on their loan to purchase their family home.148  Mr. Santana 
paid for the mortgage and improvements with community property.149  
Unbeknownst to Mrs. Santana, Mr. Santana sold the home to his brother for 
$170,000 in 2005, although Mr. and Mrs. Santana continued to live 
there.150  In 2006, Mr. and Mrs. Santana separated, and Mr. Santana’s 
brother began eviction proceedings against Mrs. Santana.151  Mr. Santana’s 
brother subsequently sold the home in 2007 for $274,500.152  Mrs. Santana 
argued on appeal that the evidence showed that: 
 
 141. In re Marriage of Kahn, No. A128001, 2012 WL 1079579 at *3. 
 142. Id. at *4.  This destruction of evidence was particularly important because Mr. Kahn 
was blind so he relied on the tapes to document conversations with his attorney.  Id. at *1, 
*2. 
 143. Id. at *5. 
 144. Id. at *17–18. 
 145. Mrs. Kahn’s impulse to throw out Mr. Kahn’s things is exceedingly common, if 
Google.com is any indication, as there are approximately 149,000 results when searching 
“throwing away ex’s stuff.”  GOOGLE, https://www.google.com (last visited Oct. 28, 2013). 
 146. In re Marriage of Kahn, No. A128001, 2012 WL 1079579 at *3. 
 147. Id. at *5, *10, *12. 
 148. In re Marriage of Santana, No. E050070, 2011 WL 3566974 at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Aug. 15, 2011). 
 149. Id. at *1, *3. 
 150. Id. at *1. 
 151. Id. at *2. 
 152. Id. 
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[Mrs. Santana] did not understand the legal effect of the deed she 
signed because, in addition to her own testimony to that effect, 
[Mr. Santana] admitted that she lacked competence in financial 
matters and lacked experience in real estate, and that she probably 
did not understand the effect of the deed.  Indeed, [Mr. Santana] 
testified during his deposition that he believed the house belonged 
to them jointly because they were married.  He testified that he 
took title in his name alone because of the Hispanic tradition that 
the man is in charge.153 
She also criticized the trial court’s reliance on Mr. Santana’s testimony 
that Mrs. Santana “had said on a number of times that the house was [Mr. 
Santana’s] and that she did not want anything to do with it,”154 as well as its 
reliance on irrelevant evidence.  In fact, the appellate court concluded that 
the trial court relied on incorrect reasoning that “reflects considerable 
hostility toward [Mrs. Santana] because of her supposed failure to 
contribute ‘her’ money to the mortgage payments while allowing [Mr. 
Santana] to use ‘his’ money for that purpose,”155 when in fact the money 
that Mr. Santana used to pay the mortgage was his earnings,156 and 
therefore community property.157  Although the trial court relied on some 
incorrect reasoning, the appellate court found that substantial evidence 
supported the trial court’s ruling because, ultimately, the trial court found 
Mr. Santana’s testimony more credible than Mrs. Santana’s.158 
Many other appellate court cases explicitly refer to witness credibility 
as a factor in the decision-making process.159  Once that determination has 
been made, the appellate courts cannot reweigh the evidence.160  This 
situation creates a pressure to prepare very well for trial, and a likelihood 
that, where the partners have grossly unequal assets, the partner with 
greater financial assets will be able to spend more time with his or her 
lawyer preparing to testify.  It also contravenes the statutory intent of 
 
 153. In re Marriage of Santana, No. E050070, 2011 WL 3566974 at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Aug. 15, 2011). 
 154. Id. at *3. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 158. In re Marriage of Santana, No. E050070, 2011 WL 3566974 at *4. 
 159. See In re Marriage of Gitibin, No. G025719, 2001 WL 1521936 at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Nov. 29, 2001); In re Marriage of Friedman, No. D038197, 2002 WL 260031 *6 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Feb. 25, 2002); In re Marriage of Tabibian, No. H021361, 2002 WL 1004094 *9 (Cal. 
Ct. App. May 16, 2002); In re Soliman, No. E030034, 2002 WL 31188703 at *1, *3, *5, *6 
(Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2002); In re Marriage of Pavin, No. D041205, 2004 WL 170442 at *1 
(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2004); In re Marriage of Prokuski, No. F047224, 2006 WL 1606981 
at *12, *17,*21 (Cal. Ct. App. June 13, 2006); In re Marriage of Hancock, No. G037502, 
2007 WL 1508717 at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. May 24, 2007); In re Marriage of Campbell, No. 
F052730, 2008 WL 2569179 at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. June 30, 2008). 
 160. In re Marriage of Balcof, 141 Cal. App. 4th 1509, 1531 (2006). 
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section 852(a) by increasing the likelihood of perjury, which was one of the 
Law Revision Commission’s main reasons for recommending the passage 
of section 852(a).161  Finally, it results in increased uncertainty about 
outcomes because of the number of human factors involved.   
III.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF 
COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 
A. FOR THE LEGISLATURE 
The Legislature’s changing position on the statute of frauds for 
transmutations has led to increasing litigation and uncertainty for partners 
transmuting property.  The purpose of section 852(a) has been gravely 
undermined by the application of section 721(b), to the disadvantage of 
partners who cannot afford to hire separate attorneys to represent each 
partner, pay to consult with family law specialists, or predict the possibility 
of dissolution when they make estate plans.  As discussed in Section II, 
many California courts, with the notable exception of the Burkle court,162 
have liberally interpreted the language “any unfair advantage” in section 
721(b) to apply to situations where a mere financial advantage to one party 
is sufficient to raise the presumption of undue influence, leading the court 
down a thorny path away from the language of the partners’ written 
agreement.  This language should be amended to more accurately reflect 
the Legislature’s intent and to provide additional guidance for courts in 
interpreting this standard.  Particularly, the Legislature should clarify 
whether courts can continue to assume that mere lack of consideration on 
the part of the advantaged partner is sufficient to raise the presumption of 
undue influence.  Amending the “any unfair advantage” language in section 
721(b) to refer only to transactions that disadvantage the community estate 
would bring the statute more in line with the goals and vision of the 
California community property system. 
B. FOR THE COURTS 
If the Legislature declines to act, California courts must clarify the 
standards for assessing what constitutes “any unfair advantage” sufficient 
to raise the presumption of undue influence, and what constitutes effective 
rebuttal evidence.  Because this boundary is largely judicially drawn, 
California courts can and should overturn prior decisions that find that the 
presumption can be raised merely by showing a financial advantage to one 
party with no (or inadequate) consideration given.  The process of 
characterizing property is already fact-intensive, so trial courts would be in 
an advantageous position to assess whether the partners obtained mutual 
 
 161. RECOMMENDATION RELATING TO MARITAL PROPERTY PRESUMPTIONS, supra note 44, 
at 214. 
 162. In re Marriage of Burkle, 139 Cal. App. 4th 712, 732–33 (2006). 
CRAIG FINAL TO PRINT 10.29 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/31/2013  1:06 PM 
Winter 2014] TRANSMUTATIONS AND UNDUE INFLUENCE 101 
advantages and should take a more holistic approach to this process, 
following the example of the Burkle court.163  Additionally, courts must 
clarify whether language included in the written agreement can constitute 
effective rebuttal evidence.  That is, the California Supreme Court should 
explicitly overrule In re Marriage of Lico164 if it disapproves of the ruling, 
and give guidance as to whether to follow In re Marriage of Lund165 in all, 
or only in limited, circumstances. 
Parties to a dissolution are typically at their emotional worst at the end 
of their relationship.  Courts need to provide as little leeway as possible to 
allow former partners to perjure themselves or otherwise use the adversary 
nature of court proceedings to inflict harm on each other. 
C. FOR ATTORNEYS 
If clients are contemplating transmutation, the attorney ought to 
encourage the clients to hire independent counsel to represent each partner, 
following the standard used when entering into premarital agreements.166  
Hiring independent counsel will help protect not only the clients, but also 
the attorney from the possibility of having to testify in a later divorce 
proceeding.167 
Attorneys preparing estate plans who are not divorce or family lawyers 
may wish to consider hiring a divorce or family law specialist to counsel 
clients about the ramifications of any transmutation agreement included in 
the trust paperwork.  Given the current unpredictability about whether the 
trial judge at dissolution will follow Lund168 or, like the trial judge in Lico, 
allow an adversely affected partner to testify that he or she did not 
understand the effect of the transmutation agreement even though a 
statement above the signature block attests otherwise,169 drafters of 
transmutation or community property agreements should add recitals at the 
beginning of the agreements, attesting that the transmutation “was freely 
and voluntarily made, and with a full knowledge of all the facts, and with a 
complete understanding of the effect of the transfer.”170  If the attorney and 
clients all sign an attestation that the attorney has informed the clients of 
 
 163. Burkle, 139 Cal. App. 4th at 732–33. 
 164. In re Marriage of Lico, No. A130765, 2012 WL 1560450 *9 (Cal. Ct. App. May 4, 
2012) (holding that inclusion of language indicating understanding of the signor in a clearly 
written Community Property Agreement did not rebut the presumption of undue influence 
where the signor testified at trial that he did not understand what he had signed). 
 165. 174 Cal. App. 4th 40, 56 (2009) (holding that signature block stating that signor read 
and understood the Transmutation Agreement rebutted the presumption of undue influence). 
 166. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615(c)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 167. At the very least, if the clients refuse to hire independent counsel, the attorney should 
obtain their written consent to joint representation to avoid possible discipline for violating 
the Rules of Professional Conduct.  CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-310(C)(1) (West, 
Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2013). 
 168. In re Marriage of Lund, 174 Cal. App. 4th at 56. 
 169. In re Marriage of Lico, No. A130765, 2012 WL 1560450 at *9. 
 170. In re Marriage of Haines, 33 Cal. App. 4th 277, 296 (1995). 
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these legal consequences, the trier of fact likely would find the presumption 
of undue influence rebutted. 
Attorneys should advise clients that courts have previously held that a 
transmutation, even if contemplated for the purpose of estate planning, 
results in an immediate change in characterization of the underlying 
property.171  Clients cannot have their cake and eat it too. 
Unfortunately, in these cases, more information appears to be better 
than less to help the court make the right decision about whether the 
presumption applies.  This factor weighs against judicial economy, but if 
the asset in dispute is large enough and the transmutation makes a big 
impact on what a client is likely to receive, the attorney must prepare to 
spend a lot of time putting forth evidence on the matter.  Some trial court 
judges are conscious of this issue, so they will make allowances where the 
asset is particularly important.  But if the transmutation does not matter to 
the overall outcome for the client, the judge will be unimpressed by the 
client continuing to bicker over something that can be handled with an 
equalization payment or increased support.172 
D. FOR SPOUSES OR REGISTERED DOMESTIC PARTNERS 
If you are contemplating an estate plan, consult with a divorce or 
family law practitioner to learn about consequences should your 
relationship end in dissolution. 
Insist that your attorney carefully explain all legal consequences of any 
transmutation agreement with you and your partner. 
Consider hiring independent counsel173 for each partner if you are 
contemplating a transmutation.  Mutually decide whether you will use 
community funds or separate funds to pay the attorney’s fees.  Lack of 
independent counsel, by itself, will not be enough to find that your 
transmutation agreement is invalid, but the court is likely to consider it as 
one of the factors in determining whether your agreement was voluntary, as 
it does in the context of premarital agreements.174 
If you or your partner has to quitclaim in connection with a loan, ask 
your lender, your attorney, and your accountant whether you can hold title 
jointly later.  Discuss with your partner whether you will change title to the 
property into both your names after the deed of trust is recorded, and, if so, 
how soon thereafter. 
Remember, because California courts divide assets equitably, proof of 
transmutations is important; but in some cases, particularly where spousal 
support can be marshaled to compensate for a disparity in assets, 
 
 171. In re Marriage of Holtemann, 166 Cal. App. 4th 1166, 1172–73 (2008). 
 172. See In re Marriage of Kahn, No. A128001, 2012 WL 1079579 at *15 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Apr. 2, 2012). 
 173. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615(c)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.). 
 174. In re Marriage of Bonds, 24 Cal. 4th 1, 18 (2000). 
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continuing to focus on specific property could make you less sympathetic 
in the eyes of the judge. 
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